

Isogenies: The basics, some applications, and ~~nothing~~ much in between


Lorenz Panny

Technische Universität München

5 December 2023

Big picture 🔍 🔍

- ▶ Isogenies are a source of **exponentially**-sized **graphs**.



Big picture 🔍 🔍

- ▶ Isogenies are a source of **exponentially**-sized **graphs**.
- ▶ We can **walk efficiently** on these graphs.

Big picture 🔍 🔍

- ▶ Isogenies are a source of **exponentially**-sized **graphs**.
- ▶ We can **walk efficiently** on these graphs.
- ▶ **Fast mixing**: short paths to (almost) all nodes.

Big picture 🔍 🔍

- ▶ Isogenies are a source of exponentially-sized graphs.
- ▶ We can walk efficiently on these graphs.
- ▶ Fast mixing: short paths to (almost) all nodes.
- ▶ No efficient* algorithms to recover paths from endpoints.
(Both classical and quantum!)

Big picture 🔍 🔍

- ▶ Isogenies are a source of exponentially-sized graphs.
- ▶ We can walk efficiently on these graphs.
- ▶ Fast mixing: short paths to (almost) all nodes.
- ▶ No efficient* algorithms to recover paths from endpoints.
(Both classical and quantum!)
- ▶ Enough structure to navigate the graph meaningfully.
That is: some *well-behaved* “directions” to describe paths.

Big picture 🔍 🔍

- ▶ Isogenies are a source of **exponentially**-sized **graphs**.
- ▶ We can **walk efficiently** on these graphs.
- ▶ **Fast mixing**: short paths to (almost) all nodes.
- ▶ **No efficient*** algorithms to **recover paths** from endpoints.
(*Both* classical and quantum!)
- ▶ **Enough structure** to **navigate** the graph meaningfully.
That is: some *well-behaved* “directions” to describe paths.

Finding graphs with *almost* all of these properties is easy —
but getting **all at once** seems rare.

Crypto on graphs?

Diffie–Hellman key exchange 1976


Public parameters:

- ▶ a finite group G (traditionally \mathbb{F}_p^* , today elliptic curves)
- ▶ an element $g \in G$ of prime order q

Diffie–Hellman key exchange 1976

Public parameters:


- ▶ a finite group G (traditionally \mathbb{F}_p^* , today elliptic curves)
- ▶ an element $g \in G$ of prime order q



Diffie–Hellman key exchange 1976

Public parameters:

- ▶ a finite group G (traditionally \mathbb{F}_p^* , today elliptic curves)
- ▶ an element $g \in G$ of prime order q



Fundamental reason this works: \cdot^a and \cdot^b are **commutative**!

Diffie–Hellman: Bob vs. Eve

Bob

1. Set $t \leftarrow g$.
2. Set $t \leftarrow t \cdot g$.
3. Set $t \leftarrow t \cdot g$.
4. Set $t \leftarrow t \cdot g$.

...

b -2. Set $t \leftarrow t \cdot g$.

b -1. Set $t \leftarrow t \cdot g$.

b . Publish $B \leftarrow t \cdot g$.

Diffie–Hellman: Bob vs. Eve

Bob

1. Set $t \leftarrow g$.
2. Set $t \leftarrow t \cdot g$.
3. Set $t \leftarrow t \cdot g$.
4. Set $t \leftarrow t \cdot g$.

...

$b-2$. Set $t \leftarrow t \cdot g$.

$b-1$. Set $t \leftarrow t \cdot g$.

b . Publish $B \leftarrow t \cdot g$.

Is this a good idea?

Diffie–Hellman: Bob vs. Eve

Bob

1. Set $t \leftarrow g$.
2. Set $t \leftarrow t \cdot g$.
3. Set $t \leftarrow t \cdot g$.
4. Set $t \leftarrow t \cdot g$.
- ...
- $b-2$. Set $t \leftarrow t \cdot g$.
- $b-1$. Set $t \leftarrow t \cdot g$.
- b . Publish $B \leftarrow t \cdot g$.

Attacker Eve

1. Set $t \leftarrow g$. If $t = B$ return 1.
2. Set $t \leftarrow t \cdot g$. If $t = B$ return 2.
3. Set $t \leftarrow t \cdot g$. If $t = B$ return 3.
4. Set $t \leftarrow t \cdot g$. If $t = B$ return 3.
- ...
- $b-2$. Set $t \leftarrow t \cdot g$. If $t = B$ return $b-2$.
- $b-1$. Set $t \leftarrow t \cdot g$. If $t = B$ return $b-1$.
- b . Set $t \leftarrow t \cdot g$. If $t = B$ return b .
- $b+1$. Set $t \leftarrow t \cdot g$. If $t = B$ return $b+1$.
- $b+2$. Set $t \leftarrow t \cdot g$. If $t = B$ return $b+2$.
- ...

Diffie–Hellman: Bob vs. Eve

Bob


1. Set $t \leftarrow g$.
2. Set $t \leftarrow t \cdot g$.
3. Set $t \leftarrow t \cdot g$.
4. Set $t \leftarrow t \cdot g$.
- ...
- $b-2$. Set $t \leftarrow t \cdot g$.
- $b-1$. Set $t \leftarrow t \cdot g$.
- b . Publish $B \leftarrow t \cdot g$.

Attacker Eve

1. Set $t \leftarrow g$. If $t = B$ return 1.
2. Set $t \leftarrow t \cdot g$. If $t = B$ return 2.
3. Set $t \leftarrow t \cdot g$. If $t = B$ return 3.
4. Set $t \leftarrow t \cdot g$. If $t = B$ return 3.
- ...
- $b-2$. Set $t \leftarrow t \cdot g$. If $t = B$ return $b-2$.
- $b-1$. Set $t \leftarrow t \cdot g$. If $t = B$ return $b-1$.
- b . Set $t \leftarrow t \cdot g$. If $t = B$ return b .
- $b+1$. Set $t \leftarrow t \cdot g$. If $t = B$ return $b+1$.
- $b+2$. Set $t \leftarrow t \cdot g$. If $t = B$ return $b+2$.
- ...


Effort for both: $O(\#G)$. Bob needs to be smarter.

(This attacker is also kind of dumb, but that doesn't matter for my point here.)




Bob computes his public key g^{13} from g .

multiply




Bob computes his public key g^{13} from g .

Square-and-multiply




Bob computes his public key g^{13} from g .

Square-and-multiply-and-square-and-multiply




Bob computes his public key g^{13} from g .

Square-and-multiply-and-square-and-multiply-and-squ




Bob computes his public key g^{13} from g .


Square-and-multiply as graphs




Square-and-multiply as graphs




Square-and-multiply as graphs



Square-and-multiply as graphs



Square-and-multiply as a graph



Crypto on graphs?

We've been doing it all the time!

The fast mixing requirement

Fast mixing: paths of length $\log(\# \text{ nodes})$ to everywhere.

The fast mixing requirement

Fast mixing: paths of length $\log(\# \text{ nodes})$ to everywhere.

With square-and-multiply, computing $\alpha \mapsto g^\alpha$ takes $\Theta(\log \alpha)$.

The fast mixing requirement

Fast mixing: paths of length $\log(\# \text{ nodes})$ to everywhere.

With square-and-multiply, computing $\alpha \mapsto g^\alpha$ takes $\Theta(\log \alpha)$.

For well-chosen groups, computing $g^\alpha \mapsto \alpha$ takes $\Theta(\sqrt{\#G})$.

The fast mixing requirement

Fast mixing: paths of length $\log(\# \text{ nodes})$ to everywhere.

With square-and-multiply, computing $\alpha \mapsto g^\alpha$ takes $\Theta(\log \alpha)$.

For well-chosen groups, computing $g^\alpha \mapsto \alpha$ takes $\Theta(\sqrt{\#G})$.

\rightsquigarrow Exponential separation!

The fast mixing requirement

Fast mixing: paths of length $\log(\# \text{ nodes})$ to everywhere.

With square-and-multiply, computing $\alpha \mapsto g^\alpha$ takes $\Theta(\log \alpha)$.

For well-chosen groups, computing $g^\alpha \mapsto \alpha$ takes $\Theta(\sqrt{\#G})$.

\rightsquigarrow Exponential separation!

...and they lived happily ever after?

The fast mixing requirement

Fast mixing: paths of length $\log(\# \text{ nodes})$ to everywhere.

With square-and-multiply, computing $\alpha \mapsto g^\alpha$ takes $\Theta(\log \alpha)$.

For well-chosen groups, computing $g^\alpha \mapsto \alpha$ takes $\Theta(\sqrt{\#G})$.

\rightsquigarrow Exponential separation!

...and they lived happily ever after?

Shor's quantum algorithm computes α from g^α in any group in polynomial time.

In some cases,

isogeny graphs

can replace DLP-based constructions post-quantumly.


In some cases,

isogeny graphs

can replace ^{some} DLP-based constructions post-quantumly.

The beauty and the beast


Components of particular isogeny graphs look like this:



Which of these is good for crypto?

The beauty and the beast

Components of particular isogeny graphs look like this:




Which of these is good for crypto? Both. 😊

Plan for this talk

- ▶ High-level **overview** for intuition. ✓
- ▶ Elliptic curves & **isogenies**.
- ▶ The **CGL** hash function.
- ▶ The **CSIDH** non-interactive key exchange.
- ▶ The **SQIsign** signature scheme.

Stand back!



We're going to do math.

Elliptic curves

An **elliptic curve** over a field F of characteristic $\notin \{2, 3\}$ is* an equation of the form

$$E: y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$$

with $a, b \in F$ such that $4a^3 + 27b^2 \neq 0$.

Elliptic curves

An **elliptic curve** over a field F of characteristic $\notin \{2, 3\}$ is* an equation of the form

$$E: y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$$

with $a, b \in F$ such that $4a^3 + 27b^2 \neq 0$.

A **point** on E is a solution (x, y) , or the “fake” point ∞ .

Elliptic curves

An **elliptic curve** over a field F of characteristic $\notin \{2, 3\}$ is* an equation of the form

$$E: y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$$

with $a, b \in F$ such that $4a^3 + 27b^2 \neq 0$.

A **point** on E is a solution (x, y) , or the “fake” point ∞ .

E is an **abelian group**: we can “add” points.

Elliptic curves

An **elliptic curve** over a field F of characteristic $\notin \{2, 3\}$ is* an equation of the form

$$E: y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$$

with $a, b \in F$ such that $4a^3 + 27b^2 \neq 0$.

A **point** on E is a solution (x, y) , or the “fake” point ∞ .

E is an **abelian group**: we can “add” points.


- ▶ The neutral element is ∞ .
- ▶ The inverse of (x, y) is $(x, -y)$.
- ▶ The sum of (x_1, y_1) and (x_2, y_2) is

$$(\lambda^2 - x_1 - x_2, \lambda(2x_1 + x_2 - \lambda^2) - y_1)$$

where $\lambda = \frac{y_2 - y_1}{x_2 - x_1}$ if $x_1 \neq x_2$ and $\lambda = \frac{3x_1^2 + a}{2y_1}$ otherwise.


*do not remember
these formulas!*

Elliptic curves (picture over \mathbb{R})



The elliptic curve $y^2 = x^3 - x + 1$ over \mathbb{R} .


Elliptic curves (picture over \mathbb{R})



Addition law:


$$P + Q + R = \infty \iff \{P, Q, R\} \text{ on a straight line.}$$

Elliptic curves (picture over \mathbb{R})




The *point at infinity* ∞ lies on every vertical line.

Elliptic curves (picture over \mathbb{F}_p)



The same curve $y^2 = x^3 - x + 1$ over the **finite field** \mathbb{F}_{79} .

Elliptic curves (picture over \mathbb{F}_p)



The addition law of $y^2 = x^3 - x + 1$ over the finite field \mathbb{F}_{79} .

Isogenies

Isogenies

...are just fancily-named

nice maps

between elliptic curves.

Isogenies

An **isogeny** of elliptic curves is a **non-zero** map $E \rightarrow E'$ that is:

Isogenies

An **isogeny** of elliptic curves is a **non-zero** map $E \rightarrow E'$ that is:

- ▶ given by **rational functions**.

Isogenies

An **isogeny** of elliptic curves is a **non-zero** map $E \rightarrow E'$ that is:

- ▶ given by **rational functions**.
- ▶ a **group homomorphism**.

Isogenies

An **isogeny** of elliptic curves is a **non-zero** map $E \rightarrow E'$ that is:

- ▶ given by **rational functions**.
- ▶ a **group homomorphism**.

Reminder:

A **rational function** is $f(x, y)/g(x, y)$ where f, g are **polynomials**.

A **group homomorphism** φ satisfies $\varphi(P + Q) = \varphi(P) + \varphi(Q)$.

Isogenies

An **isogeny** of elliptic curves is a **non-zero** map $E \rightarrow E'$ that is:

- ▶ given by **rational functions**.
- ▶ a **group homomorphism**.

Reminder:

A **rational function** is $f(x, y)/g(x, y)$ where f, g are **polynomials**.

A **group homomorphism** φ satisfies $\varphi(P + Q) = \varphi(P) + \varphi(Q)$.

The **kernel** of an isogeny $\varphi: E \rightarrow E'$ is $\{P \in E : \varphi(P) = \infty\}$.
The **degree** of a separable* isogeny is the size of its **kernel**.

Isogenies (examples)

An **isogeny** of elliptic curves is a **non-zero** map $E \rightarrow E'$ that is:

- ▶ given by **rational functions**.
- ▶ a **group homomorphism**.

Isogenies (examples)

An **isogeny** of elliptic curves is a **non-zero** map $E \rightarrow E'$ that is:

- ▶ given by **rational functions**.
- ▶ a **group homomorphism**.

Example #1: $(x, y) \mapsto \left(\frac{x^3 - 4x^2 + 30x - 12}{(x-2)^2}, \frac{x^3 - 6x^2 - 14x + 35}{(x-2)^3} \cdot y \right)$

defines a degree-3 isogeny of the elliptic curves

$$\{y^2 = x^3 + x\} \longrightarrow \{y^2 = x^3 - 3x + 3\}$$

over \mathbb{F}_{71} . Its kernel is $\{(2, 9), (2, -9), \infty\}$.

Isogenies (examples)

An **isogeny** of elliptic curves is a **non-zero** map $E \rightarrow E'$ that is:

- ▶ given by **rational functions**.
- ▶ a **group homomorphism**.

Example #2: For any a and b , the map $\iota: (x, y) \mapsto (-x, \sqrt{-1} \cdot y)$ defines a degree-1 isogeny of the elliptic curves

$$\{y^2 = x^3 + ax + b\} \longrightarrow \{y^2 = x^3 + ax - b\}.$$

It is an **isomorphism**; its kernel is $\{\infty\}$.

Isogenies (examples)

An **isogeny** of elliptic curves is a **non-zero** map $E \rightarrow E'$ that is:

- ▶ given by **rational functions**.
- ▶ a **group homomorphism**.

Example #3: For each $m \neq 0$, the multiplication-by- m map

$$[m]: E \rightarrow E$$

Isogenies (examples)

An **isogeny** of elliptic curves is a **non-zero** map $E \rightarrow E'$ that is:

- ▶ given by **rational functions**.
- ▶ a **group homomorphism**.

Example #3: For each $m \neq 0$, the multiplication-by- m map

$$[m]: E \rightarrow E$$

is a degree- m^2 isogeny. If $m \neq 0$ in the base field, its kernel is

$$E[m] \cong \mathbb{Z}/m \times \mathbb{Z}/m.$$

Isogenies (examples)

An **isogeny** of elliptic curves is a **non-zero** map $E \rightarrow E'$ that is:

- ▶ given by **rational functions**.
- ▶ a **group homomorphism**.

Example #4: For E/\mathbb{F}_q , the map

$$\pi: (x, y) \mapsto (x^q, y^q)$$

is a degree- q isogeny, the *Frobenius endomorphism*.

Isogenies (examples)

An **isogeny** of elliptic curves is a **non-zero** map $E \rightarrow E'$ that is:

- ▶ given by **rational functions**.
- ▶ a **group homomorphism**.

Example #4: For E/\mathbb{F}_q , the map

$$\pi: (x, y) \mapsto (x^q, y^q)$$

is a degree- q isogeny, the *Frobenius endomorphism*.

The **kernel** of $\pi - 1$ is precisely the set of **rational points** $E(\mathbb{F}_q)$.

Isogenies (examples)

An **isogeny** of elliptic curves is a **non-zero** map $E \rightarrow E'$ that is:

- ▶ given by **rational functions**.
- ▶ a **group homomorphism**.

Example #4: For E/\mathbb{F}_q , the map

$$\pi: (x, y) \mapsto (x^q, y^q)$$

is a degree- q isogeny, the *Frobenius endomorphism*.

The **kernel** of $\pi - 1$ is precisely the set of **rational points** $E(\mathbb{F}_q)$.

Important fact: An isogeny φ is **\mathbb{F}_q -rational** iff $\pi \circ \varphi = \varphi \circ \pi$.

Isogenies and kernels

For any **finite** subgroup G of E , there exists a **unique**¹ separable* isogeny $\varphi_G: E \rightarrow E'$ with **kernel** G .

¹(up to isomorphism of E')

Isogenies and kernels

For any **finite** subgroup G of E , there exists a **unique**¹ separable* isogeny $\varphi_G: E \rightarrow E'$ with **kernel** G .

The curve E' is denoted by E/G . (cf. quotient groups)

¹(up to isomorphism of E')

Isogenies and kernels

For any **finite** subgroup G of E , there exists a **unique**¹ separable* isogeny $\varphi_G: E \rightarrow E'$ with **kernel** G .

The curve E' is denoted by E/G . (cf. quotient groups)

If G is defined over k , then φ_G and E/G are also **defined over k** .

¹(up to isomorphism of E')

Isogenies and kernels

For any **finite** subgroup G of E , there exists a **unique**¹ separable* isogeny $\varphi_G: E \rightarrow E'$ with **kernel** G .

The curve E' is denoted by E/G . (cf. quotient groups)

If G is defined over k , then φ_G and E/G are also **defined over k** .

\rightsquigarrow To choose an isogeny, simply choose a finite subgroup.

¹(up to isomorphism of E')

Isogenies and kernels

For any **finite** subgroup G of E , there exists a **unique**¹ separable* isogeny $\varphi_G: E \rightarrow E'$ with **kernel** G .

The curve E' is denoted by E/G . (cf. quotient groups)

If G is defined over k , then φ_G and E/G are also **defined over** k .

↪ To choose an isogeny, simply choose a finite subgroup.

- ▶ We have formulas to **compute** and **evaluate** isogenies.
(...but they are **only** efficient for “small” degrees!)

¹(up to isomorphism of E')

Isogenies and kernels

For any **finite** subgroup G of E , there exists a **unique**¹ separable* isogeny $\varphi_G: E \rightarrow E'$ with **kernel** G .

The curve E' is denoted by E/G . (cf. quotient groups)

If G is defined over k , then φ_G and E/G are also **defined over k** .

↪ To choose an isogeny, simply choose a finite subgroup.

- ▶ We have formulas to **compute** and **evaluate** isogenies.
(...but they are **only** efficient for “small” degrees!)

↪ **Decompose** large-degree isogenies into **prime steps**.
That is: **Walk** in an **isogeny graph**.

¹(up to isomorphism of E')

Isogeny graphs

Consider a field k and let $S \not\ni \text{char}(k)$ be a set of primes.

The S -isogeny graph over k consists of

Isogeny graphs

Consider a field k and let $S \not\ni \text{char}(k)$ be a set of primes.

The S -isogeny graph over k consists of

- ▶ vertices given by elliptic curves over k ;

Isogeny graphs

Consider a field k and let $S \not\ni \text{char}(k)$ be a set of primes.

The S -isogeny graph over k consists of

- ▶ vertices given by elliptic curves over k ;
- ▶ edges given by ℓ -isogenies, $\ell \in S$, over k ;

Isogeny graphs

Consider a field k and let $S \not\ni \text{char}(k)$ be a set of primes.

The S -isogeny graph over k consists of

- ▶ vertices given by elliptic curves over k ;
- ▶ edges given by ℓ -isogenies, $\ell \in S$, over k ;

up to k -isomorphism.

Isogeny graphs


Consider a field k and let $S \not\ni \text{char}(k)$ be a set of primes.

The S -isogeny graph over k consists of


- ▶ vertices given by elliptic curves over k ;
- ▶ edges given by ℓ -isogenies, $\ell \in S$, over k ;

up to k -isomorphism.

Example components containing $E: y^2 = x^3 + x$:



$$k = \mathbb{F}_{419}, S = \{3, 5, 7\}$$



$$k = \mathbb{F}_{4312}, S = \{2, 3, 5, 7\}.$$

Predictable groups

Elliptic curves in general can be very **annoying**

Predictable groups

Elliptic curves in general can be very **annoying** *computationally*:
Points in $E[\ell]$ have a tendency to live in **large extension fields**.

Predictable groups

Elliptic curves in general can be very **annoying** computationally:
Points in $E[\ell]$ have a tendency to live in **large extension fields**.

Solution:

Let $p \geq 5$ be prime.

- ▶ E/\mathbb{F}_p is supersingular if and only if $\#E(\mathbb{F}_p) = p+1$.
- ▶ In that case, $E(\mathbb{F}_p) \cong \mathbb{Z}/(p+1)$ and
 $E(\mathbb{F}_{p^2}) \cong \mathbb{Z}/(p+1) \times \mathbb{Z}/(p+1)$.

Predictable groups

Elliptic curves in general can be very **annoying** computationally:
Points in $E[\ell]$ have a tendency to live in **large extension fields**.

Solution:

Let $p \geq 5$ be prime.

- ▶ E/\mathbb{F}_p is *supersingular* if and only if $\#E(\mathbb{F}_p) = p+1$.
- ▶ In that case, $E(\mathbb{F}_p) \cong \mathbb{Z}/(p+1)$ and
 $E(\mathbb{F}_{p^2}) \cong \mathbb{Z}/(p+1) \times \mathbb{Z}/(p+1)$.

- ↪ Easy method to **control the group structure** by choosing p !
- ↪ **Cryptography** works well using **supersingular curves**.

Predictable groups

Elliptic curves in general can be very **annoying** computationally:
Points in $E[\ell]$ have a tendency to live in **large extension fields**.

Solution:

Let $p \geq 5$ be prime.

- ▶ E/\mathbb{F}_p is supersingular if and only if $\#E(\mathbb{F}_p) = p+1$.
- ▶ In that case, $E(\mathbb{F}_p) \cong \mathbb{Z}/(p+1)$ and
 $E(\mathbb{F}_{p^2}) \cong \mathbb{Z}/(p+1) \times \mathbb{Z}/(p+1)$.


- ↪ Easy method to **control the group structure** by choosing p !
- ↪ **Cryptography** works well using **supersingular curves**.

(All curves are supersingular until lunch time.)

Plan for this talk

- ▶ High-level **overview** for intuition. ✓
- ▶ Elliptic curves & **isogenies**. ✓
- ▶ The **CGL** hash function.
- ▶ The **CSIDH** non-interactive key exchange.
- ▶ The **SQIsign** signature scheme.

The Charles–Goren–Lauter hash function



- ▶ Start at some curve E .
- ▶ For each input digit b : Map the pair (E, b) to a finite subgroup $H \leq E$, compute $\varphi_H: E \rightarrow E'$, and set $E \leftarrow E'$.
- ▶ Finally return E .

Plan for this talk

- ▶ High-level **overview** for intuition. ✓
- ▶ Elliptic curves & **isogenies**. ✓
- ▶ The **CGL** hash function. ✓
- ▶ The **CSIDH** non-interactive key exchange.
- ▶ The **SQIsign** signature scheme.




CSIDH ['siː,saɪd]

[Castrыck-Lange-Martindale-Panny-Renes 2018]

Isogeny-based key exchange: High-level view


E

Isogeny-based key exchange: High-level view




- ▶ Alice & Bob pick secret $\varphi_A: E \rightarrow E_A$ and $\varphi_B: E \rightarrow E_B$.
(These isogenies correspond to **walking** on the **isogeny graph**.)

Isogeny-based key exchange: High-level view




- ▶ Alice & Bob pick secret $\varphi_A: E \rightarrow E_A$ and $\varphi_B: E \rightarrow E_B$.
(These isogenies correspond to **walking** on the **isogeny graph**.)
- ▶ Alice and Bob transmit the end curves E_A and E_B .

Isogeny-based key exchange: High-level view




- ▶ Alice & Bob pick secret $\varphi_A: E \rightarrow E_A$ and $\varphi_B: E \rightarrow E_B$. (These isogenies correspond to **walking** on the **isogeny graph**.)
- ▶ Alice and Bob transmit the end curves E_A and E_B .
- ▶ Alice somehow finds a “parallel” $\varphi_{A'}: E_B \rightarrow E_{BA}$, and Bob somehow finds $\varphi_{B'}: E_A \rightarrow E_{AB}$,

Isogeny-based key exchange: High-level view




- ▶ Alice & Bob pick secret $\varphi_A: E \rightarrow E_A$ and $\varphi_B: E \rightarrow E_B$. (These isogenies correspond to **walking** on the **isogeny graph**.)
- ▶ Alice and Bob transmit the end curves E_A and E_B .
- ▶ Alice somehow finds a “parallel” $\varphi'_A: E_B \rightarrow E_{BA}$, and Bob somehow finds $\varphi'_{B'}: E_A \rightarrow E_{AB}$, such that $E_{AB} \cong E_{BA}$.

How to find “parallel” isogenies?



How to find “parallel” isogenies?



CSIDH's solution:

Use **special** isogenies φ_A which can be transported to the curve E_B totally **independently** of the secret isogeny φ_B .

(Similarly with reversed roles, of course.)

“Special” isogenies

Let E/\mathbb{F}_p be supersingular and recall $E(\mathbb{F}_p) \cong \mathbb{Z}/(p+1)$.

“Special” isogenies

Let E/\mathbb{F}_p be supersingular and recall $E(\mathbb{F}_p) \cong \mathbb{Z}/(p+1)$.

\Rightarrow For every $\ell \mid (p+1)$ exists a **unique** order- ℓ subgroup H_ℓ .

“Special” isogenies

Let E/\mathbb{F}_p be supersingular and recall $E(\mathbb{F}_p) \cong \mathbb{Z}/(p+1)$.

\Rightarrow For every $\ell \mid (p+1)$ exists a **unique** order- ℓ subgroup H_ℓ .

\rightsquigarrow For all such E can **canonically** find an isogeny $\varphi_\ell: E \rightarrow E'$.

“Special” isogenies

Let E/\mathbb{F}_p be supersingular and recall $E(\mathbb{F}_p) \cong \mathbb{Z}/(p+1)$.

\Rightarrow For every $\ell \mid (p+1)$ exists a **unique** order- ℓ subgroup H_ℓ .

\rightsquigarrow For all such E can **canonically** find an isogeny $\varphi_\ell: E \rightarrow E'$.


We consider prime ℓ and refer to φ_ℓ as a “**special**” isogeny.

Cycles from “special” isogenies

What happens when we *iterate* such a “special” isogeny?


Cycles from “special” isogenies

What happens when we **iterate** such a “special” isogeny?



🔮 Cycles from “special” isogenies


What happens when we **iterate** such a “special” isogeny?



!! The “tail” $E \rightarrow E_{\ell^3}$ can’t exist: Backwards arrow is **unique**.

🔮 Cycles from “special” isogenies

What happens when we **iterate** such a “special” isogeny?



!! The “tail” $E \rightarrow E_{\ell^3}$ can’t exist: Backwards arrow is **unique**.


\implies The “special” isogenies φ_ℓ form **isogeny cycles**!

Compatible cycles from “special” isogenies

What happens when we **compose** those “special” isogenies?


Compatible cycles from “special” isogenies

What happens when we **compose** those “special” isogenies?



Compatible cycles from “special” isogenies


What happens when we **compose** those “special” isogenies?



► Exercise: $\ker(\varphi'_l \circ \varphi'_m) = \ker(\varphi_m \circ \varphi_l) = \langle \ker \varphi_l, \ker \varphi'_m \rangle$.

Compatible cycles from “special” isogenies

What happens when we **compose** those “special” isogenies?



► Exercise: $\ker(\varphi'_l \circ \varphi'_m) = \ker(\varphi_m \circ \varphi_l) = \langle \ker \varphi_l, \ker \varphi'_m \rangle$.

!! The order cannot matter \implies cycles must be **compatible**.

CSIDH in one slide

CSIDH in one slide

- ▶ Choose some **small odd primes** ℓ_1, \dots, ℓ_n .
- ▶ Make sure $p = 4 \cdot \ell_1 \cdots \ell_n - 1$ is prime.

CSIDH in one slide


- ▶ Choose some **small odd primes** ℓ_1, \dots, ℓ_n .
- ▶ Make sure $p = 4 \cdot \ell_1 \cdots \ell_n - 1$ is prime.
- ▶ Let $X = \{y^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x \text{ **supersingular** with } A \in \mathbb{F}_p\}$.

CSIDH in one slide

- ▶ Choose some **small odd primes** ℓ_1, \dots, ℓ_n .
- ▶ Make sure $p = 4 \cdot \ell_1 \cdots \ell_n - 1$ is prime.
- ▶ Let $X = \{y^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x \text{ **supersingular** with } A \in \mathbb{F}_p\}$.
- ▶ Look at the “**special**” ℓ_i -isogenies within X .

CSIDH in one slide

- ▶ Choose some **small odd primes** ℓ_1, \dots, ℓ_n .
- ▶ Make sure $p = 4 \cdot \ell_1 \cdots \ell_n - 1$ is prime.
- ▶ Let $X = \{y^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x \text{ supersingular with } A \in \mathbb{F}_p\}$.
- ▶ Look at the “**special**” ℓ_i -isogenies within X .



$$p = 419$$


$$\ell_1 = 3$$

$$\ell_2 = 5$$

$$\ell_3 = 7$$

CSIDH in one slide

- ▶ Choose some **small odd primes** ℓ_1, \dots, ℓ_n .
- ▶ Make sure $p = 4 \cdot \ell_1 \cdots \ell_n - 1$ is prime.
- ▶ Let $X = \{y^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x \text{ supersingular with } A \in \mathbb{F}_p\}$.
- ▶ Look at the “**special**” ℓ_i -isogenies within X .




- ▶ Walking “left” and “right” on any ℓ_i -subgraph is **efficient**.

CSIDH key exchange


Alice

[+, +, -, -]



Bob


[-, +, -, -]



CSIDH key exchange


Alice

[\uparrow , +, -, -]



Bob


[\uparrow , -, +, -]



CSIDH key exchange


Alice

[+, +, -, -]
↑



Bob


[-, +, -, -]
↑



CSIDH key exchange


Alice

[+, +, -, -]
↑



Bob


[-, +, -, -]
↑



CSIDH key exchange


Alice

[+, +, -, -]
↑



Bob

[-, +, -, -]
↑




CSIDH key exchange

Alice

[+, +, -, -]

Bob


[-, +, -, -]



CSIDH key exchange


Alice

[\uparrow , +, +, -, -]



Bob


[\uparrow , -, +, -, -]



CSIDH key exchange


Alice

[+, +, -, -]
↑



Bob


[-, +, -, -]
↑



CSIDH key exchange


Alice

[+, +, -, -]
↑



Bob


[-, +, -, -]
↑



CSIDH key exchange


Alice

[+, +, -, -]
↑



Bob


[-, +, -, -]
↑



CSIDH key exchange


Alice

[+, +, -, -]



Bob

[-, +, -, -]



And... action! 

Cycles are compatible: [right then left] = [left then right]

And... action! 

Cycles are **compatible**: [right then left] = [left then right]

\rightsquigarrow only need to keep track of **total step counts** for each ℓ_i .

Example: [+ , + , - , - , - , + , - , -] just becomes (+1, 0, -3) $\in \mathbb{Z}^3$.

And... action! 

Cycles are **compatible**: [right then left] = [left then right]

\rightsquigarrow only need to keep track of **total step counts** for each ℓ_i .

Example: [+ , + , - , - , - , + , - , -] just becomes (+1, 0, -3) $\in \mathbb{Z}^3$.

There is a **group action** of $(\mathbb{Z}^n, +)$ on our **set of curves** X !

The class group

Recall: Group action of $(\mathbb{Z}^n, +)$ on set of curves X .

The class group

Recall: Group action of $(\mathbb{Z}^n, +)$ on set of curves X .

!! The set X is **finite** \implies The action is **not free**.

There exist vectors $\underline{v} \in \mathbb{Z}^n \setminus \{0\}$ which **act trivially**.

The class group

Recall: Group action of $(\mathbb{Z}^n, +)$ on set of curves X .

!! The set X is **finite** \implies The action is **not free**.

There exist vectors $\underline{v} \in \mathbb{Z}^n \setminus \{0\}$ which **act trivially**.

Such \underline{v} form a **full-rank subgroup** $\Lambda \subseteq \mathbb{Z}^n$.

The class group

Recall: Group action of $(\mathbb{Z}^n, +)$ on set of curves X .

!! The set X is **finite** \implies The action is **not free**.

There exist vectors $\underline{v} \in \mathbb{Z}^n \setminus \{0\}$ which **act trivially**.

Such \underline{v} form a **full-rank subgroup** $\Lambda \subseteq \mathbb{Z}^n$.

We **understand the structure**: By complex-multiplication theory, the quotient \mathbb{Z}^n / Λ is the **ideal-class group** $\text{cl}(\mathbb{Z}[\sqrt{-p}])$.

The class group

Recall: Group action of $(\mathbb{Z}^n, +)$ on set of curves X .

!! The set X is **finite** \implies The action is **not free**.

There exist vectors $\underline{v} \in \mathbb{Z}^n \setminus \{0\}$ which **act trivially**.

Such \underline{v} form a **full-rank subgroup** $\Lambda \subseteq \mathbb{Z}^n$.

We **understand the structure**: By complex-multiplication theory, the quotient \mathbb{Z}^n / Λ is the **ideal-class group** $\text{cl}(\mathbb{Z}[\sqrt{-p}])$.

!! This group characterizes *when two paths lead to the same curve*.

Why no Shor?

Shor's quantum algorithm computes α from g^α in any group in polynomial time.

Why no Shor?

Shor's quantum algorithm computes α from g^α in any group in polynomial time.

Shor computes α from $h = g^\alpha$ by finding the kernel of the map

$$f: \mathbb{Z}^2 \rightarrow G, (x, y) \mapsto g^x \cdot h^y.$$

Why no Shor?

Shor's quantum algorithm computes α from g^α in any group in polynomial time.

Shor computes α from $h = g^\alpha$ by finding the kernel of the map


$$f: \mathbb{Z}^2 \rightarrow G, (x, y) \mapsto g^x \cdot h^y.$$

\uparrow

For group actions, we simply cannot compose $a * s$ and $b * s$!

Plan for this talk

- ▶ High-level **overview** for intuition. ✓
- ▶ Elliptic curves & **isogenies**. ✓
- ▶ The **CGL** hash function. ✓
- ▶ The **CSIDH** non-interactive key exchange. ✓
- ▶ The **SQIsign** signature scheme.



Now:

Supersingular isogeny graphs over \mathbb{F}_{p^2} .

More “special” isogenies

- ▶ Earlier: “Special” isogenies φ_ℓ with rational kernel points.

More “special” isogenies

- ▶ Earlier: “Special” isogenies φ_ℓ with rational kernel points.
- ▶ In other words: $\ker \varphi_\ell = \ker[\ell] \cap \ker(\pi - 1)$.
(Recall the Frobenius endomorphism $\pi: (x, y) \mapsto (x^p, y^p)$.)

More “special” isogenies

- ▶ Earlier: “Special” isogenies φ_ℓ with rational kernel points.
- ▶ In other words: $\ker \varphi_\ell = \ker[\ell] \cap \ker(\pi - 1)$.
(Recall the Frobenius endomorphism $\pi: (x, y) \mapsto (x^p, y^p)$.)
- !! Over \mathbb{F}_{p^2} , we can have more endomorphisms.
Example: $y^2 = x^3 + x$ has $\iota: (x, y) \mapsto (-x, \sqrt{-1} \cdot y)$.

More “special” isogenies

- ▶ Earlier: “Special” isogenies φ_ℓ with rational kernel points.
- ▶ In other words: $\ker \varphi_\ell = \ker[\ell] \cap \ker(\pi - 1)$.
(Recall the Frobenius endomorphism $\pi: (x, y) \mapsto (x^p, y^p)$.)

!! Over \mathbb{F}_{p^2} , we can have more endomorphisms.

Example: $y^2 = x^3 + x$ has $\iota: (x, y) \mapsto (-x, \sqrt{-1} \cdot y)$.

- ▶ Extremely non-obvious fact in this setting:

Every isogeny $\varphi: E \rightarrow E'$ comes from a subset $I_\varphi \subseteq \text{End}(E)$.

More “special” isogenies

- ▶ Earlier: “Special” isogenies φ_ℓ with rational kernel points.
- ▶ In other words: $\ker \varphi_\ell = \ker[\ell] \cap \ker(\pi - 1)$.
(Recall the Frobenius endomorphism $\pi: (x, y) \mapsto (x^p, y^p)$.)

!! Over \mathbb{F}_{p^2} , we can have more endomorphisms.

Example: $y^2 = x^3 + x$ has $\iota: (x, y) \mapsto (-x, \sqrt{-1} \cdot y)$.

- ▶ Extremely non-obvious fact in this setting:

Every isogeny $\varphi: E \rightarrow E'$ comes from a subset $I_\varphi \subseteq \text{End}(E)$.

☺ We understand the structure of $\text{End}(E)$.

More “special” isogenies

- ▶ Earlier: “Special” isogenies φ_ℓ with rational kernel points.
- ▶ In other words: $\ker \varphi_\ell = \ker[\ell] \cap \ker(\pi - 1)$.
(Recall the Frobenius endomorphism $\pi: (x, y) \mapsto (x^p, y^p)$.)

!! Over \mathbb{F}_{p^2} , we can have more endomorphisms.

Example: $y^2 = x^3 + x$ has $\iota: (x, y) \mapsto (-x, \sqrt{-1} \cdot y)$.

- ▶ Extremely non-obvious fact in this setting:

Every isogeny $\varphi: E \rightarrow E'$ comes from a subset $I_\varphi \subseteq \text{End}(E)$.

☺ We understand the structure of $\text{End}(E)$.

☺ We understand how I_φ, I_ψ relate for isogenies $\varphi, \psi: E \rightarrow E'$.
(NB: Same E' .)

The Deuring correspondence

...is the formal version of what I just said.

The Deuring correspondence

...is the *formal version* of what I just said.

...is a strong connection between two ^{*a priori*}very different worlds:

The Deuring correspondence

...is the formal version of what I just said.

...is a strong connection between two ^{*a priori*} very different worlds:

- ▶ **Supersingular elliptic curves** defined over \mathbb{F}_{p^2} .

The Deuring correspondence

...is the formal version of what I just said.

- ...is a strong connection between two ^{*a priori*} very different worlds:
- ▶ **Supersingular elliptic curves** defined over \mathbb{F}_{p^2} .
 - ▶ **Quaternions: Maximal orders** in a certain algebra $B_{p,\infty}$.

The Deuring correspondence

...is the formal version of what I just said.

...is a strong connection between two ^{*a priori*} very different worlds:

- ▶ **Supersingular elliptic curves** defined over \mathbb{F}_{p^2} .
- ▶ **Quaternions: Maximal orders** in a certain algebra $B_{p,\infty}$.

Isogenies become “**connecting ideals**” in quaternion land.

The Deuring correspondence

...is the *formal version* of what I just said.

...is a strong connection between two ^{*a priori*} very different worlds:

- ▶ **Supersingular elliptic curves** defined over \mathbb{F}_{p^2} .
- ▶ **Quaternions: Maximal orders** in a certain algebra $B_{p,\infty}$.

Isogenies become “**connecting ideals**” in quaternion land.

☺ One direction is **easy**, the other seems **hard**! \rightsquigarrow *Cryptography!*

The Deuring correspondence (examples)

Let $p = 7799999$ and let \mathbf{i}, \mathbf{j} satisfy $\mathbf{i}^2 = -1$, $\mathbf{j}^2 = -p$, $\mathbf{j}\mathbf{i} = -\mathbf{i}\mathbf{j}$.

The ring $\mathcal{O}_0 = \mathbb{Z} \oplus \mathbb{Z}\mathbf{i} \oplus \mathbb{Z}\frac{\mathbf{i}+\mathbf{j}}{2} \oplus \mathbb{Z}\frac{1+\mathbf{j}}{2}$
corresponds to the curve $E_0: y^2 = x^3 + x$.


The ring $\mathcal{O}_1 = \mathbb{Z} \oplus \mathbb{Z}4947\mathbf{i} \oplus \mathbb{Z}\frac{4947\mathbf{i}+\mathbf{j}}{2} \oplus \mathbb{Z}\frac{4947+32631010\mathbf{i}+\mathbf{j}}{9894}$
corresponds to the curve $E_1: y^2 = x^3 + 1$.

The ideal $I = \mathbb{Z}4947 \oplus \mathbb{Z}4947\mathbf{i} \oplus \mathbb{Z}\frac{598+4947\mathbf{i}+\mathbf{j}}{2} \oplus \mathbb{Z}\frac{4947+598\mathbf{i}+\mathbf{j}}{2}$
defines an isogeny $E_0 \rightarrow E_1$ of degree $4947 = 3 \cdot 17 \cdot 97$.


Signing with isogenies

$$E_0 \xrightarrow{\text{secret}} E_A$$

Signing with isogenies




Signing with isogenies



Signing with isogenies




Signing with isogenies




- Fiat–Shamir: **signature scheme** from identification scheme.

Signing with isogenies



- ▶ Fiat–Shamir: **signature scheme** from identification scheme.
- ▶ Easy response: $E_A \rightarrow E_0 \rightarrow E_1 \rightarrow E_2$. *Obviously broken.*

Signing with isogenies



- ▶ Fiat–Shamir: **signature scheme** from identification scheme.
- ▶ Easy response: $E_A \rightarrow E_0 \rightarrow E_1 \rightarrow E_2$. *Obviously broken.*
- ▶ SQIsign's solution: Construct **new path** $E_A \rightarrow E_2$ (using *secret*).

SQIsign

Main idea:

- ▶ Construct the “signature square” in quaternion land.
- ▶ Project the whole situation down to the curve world.
- ▶ The verifier can check on curves that everything is correct.

SQIsign

Main idea:

- ▶ Construct the “signature square” in quaternion land.
- ▶ Project the whole situation down to the curve world.
- ▶ The verifier can check on curves that everything is correct.

Main technical tool: The KLPT algorithm.

- ▶ From $\text{End}(E), \text{End}(E')$, can find smooth isogeny $E \rightarrow E'$.
- ▶ From $\text{End}(E), \text{End}(E')$, can randomize within $\text{Hom}(E, E')$.

SQIsign

Main idea:

- ▶ Construct the “signature square” in quaternion land.
- ▶ Project the whole situation down to the curve world.
- ▶ The verifier can check on curves that everything is correct.

Main technical tool: The KLPT algorithm.

- ▶ From $\text{End}(E), \text{End}(E')$, can find smooth isogeny $E \rightarrow E'$.
 - ▶ From $\text{End}(E), \text{End}(E')$, can randomize within $\text{Hom}(E, E')$.
- ↔ SQIsign takes the “broken” signature $E_A \rightarrow E_0 \rightarrow E_1 \rightarrow E_2$ and rewrites it into a random isogeny $E_A \rightarrow E_2$.

SQIsign

Main idea:

- ▶ Construct the “signature square” in quaternion land.
- ▶ Project the whole situation down to the curve world.
- ▶ The verifier can check on curves that everything is correct.

Main technical tool: The KLPT algorithm.

- ▶ From $\text{End}(E), \text{End}(E')$, can find smooth isogeny $E \rightarrow E'$.
 - ▶ From $\text{End}(E), \text{End}(E')$, can randomize within $\text{Hom}(E, E')$.
- ↪ SQIsign takes the “broken” signature $E_A \rightarrow E_0 \rightarrow E_1 \rightarrow E_2$ and rewrites it into a random isogeny $E_A \rightarrow E_2$.

“If you have KLPT implemented very nicely as a black box, then anyone can implement SQIsign.”

— Yan Bo Ti

SQIsign: Numbers

sizes

parameter set	public keys	signatures
NIST-I	64 bytes	177 bytes
NIST-III	96 bytes	263 bytes
NIST-V	128 bytes	335 bytes


performance

Cycle counts for a *generic C implementation* running on an Intel Ice Lake CPU. Optimizations are certainly possible and work in progress.

parameter set	keygen	signing	verifying
NIST-I	3728 megacycles	5779 megacycles	108 megacycles
NIST-III	23734 megacycles	43760 megacycles	654 megacycles
NIST-V	91049 megacycles	158544 megacycles	2177 megacycles

Source: <https://sqisign.org>

SQLsign: Comparison



Source: <https://pqshield.github.io/nist-sigs-zoo>

Plan for this talk

- ▶ High-level **overview** for intuition. ✓
- ▶ Elliptic curves & **isogenies**. ✓
- ▶ The **CGL** hash function. ✓
- ▶ The **CSIDH** non-interactive key exchange. ✓
- ▶ The **SQIsign** signature scheme. ✓

Summary

Summary

CSIDH...

- ▶ is a drop-in **post-quantum replacement** for (EC)DH.

Summary

CSIDH...

- ▶ is a drop-in **post-quantum replacement** for (EC)DH.
- ▶ is the only known somewhat **efficient post-quantum non-interactive key exchange** (full public-key validation).

Summary

CSIDH...

- ▶ is a drop-in **post-quantum replacement** for (EC)DH.
- ▶ is the only known somewhat **efficient post-quantum non-interactive key exchange** (full public-key validation).
- ▶ has a **clean** mathematical structure: a true **group action**.

Summary

CSIDH...

- ▶ is a drop-in **post-quantum replacement** for (EC)DH.
- ▶ is the only known somewhat **efficient post-quantum non-interactive key exchange** (full public-key validation).
- ▶ has a **clean** mathematical structure: a true **group action**.

SQIsign...

- ▶ has remarkably **tiny keys** and **signatures**, post-quantumly.

Summary

CSIDH...

- ▶ is a drop-in **post-quantum replacement** for (EC)DH.
- ▶ is the only known somewhat **efficient post-quantum non-interactive key exchange** (full public-key validation).
- ▶ has a **clean** mathematical structure: a true **group action**.

SQIsign...

- ▶ has remarkably **tiny keys** and **signatures**, post-quantumly.
- ▶ rests on the assumed hardness of finding **endomorphisms**.

Summary

CSIDH...

- ▶ is a drop-in **post-quantum replacement** for (EC)DH.
- ▶ is the only known somewhat **efficient post-quantum non-interactive key exchange** (full public-key validation).
- ▶ has a **clean** mathematical structure: a true **group action**.

SQIsign...

- ▶ has remarkably **tiny keys** and **signatures**, post-quantumly.
- ▶ rests on the assumed hardness of finding **endomorphisms**.

Both...

- ▶ have **tiny sizes** compared to other post-quantum schemes.

Summary

CSIDH...

- ▶ is a drop-in **post-quantum replacement** for (EC)DH.
- ▶ is the only known somewhat **efficient post-quantum non-interactive key exchange** (full public-key validation).
- ▶ has a **clean** mathematical structure: a true **group action**.

SQIsign...

- ▶ has remarkably **tiny keys** and **signatures**, post-quantumly.
- ▶ rests on the assumed hardness of finding **endomorphisms**.

Both...

- ▶ have **tiny sizes** compared to other post-quantum schemes.
- ▶ are quite **slow** compared to other post-quantum schemes.

Summary

CSIDH...

- ▶ is a drop-in **post-quantum replacement** for (EC)DH.
- ▶ is the only known somewhat **efficient post-quantum non-interactive key exchange** (full public-key validation).
- ▶ has a **clean** mathematical structure: a true **group action**.

SQIsign...

- ▶ has remarkably **tiny keys** and **signatures**, post-quantumly.
- ▶ rests on the assumed hardness of finding **endomorphisms**.

Both...

- ▶ have **tiny sizes** compared to other post-quantum schemes.
- ▶ are quite **slow** compared to other post-quantum schemes.
- ▶ are **really cool!**

Questions?